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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Science & Technology

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Attached are DDS&T recommended modifications for the ICS pages. Note that blue-highlighted text is to be deleted.

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-- A computer model, just operational, of pipelines, oil facilities in the Persian Gulf States which will enable our analysts to respond almost immediately to any bombing, sabotage or other disruption with answers on the impact of the damage, where and how to repair, to reroute, etc.

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-- A system for using combination of letters found in documents to lead analysts to relevant information buried away in huge collections of scientific literature, records, computer data, etc. New methods of access are essential if we are to continue to effectively use large collections of data being acquired from computer systems and other newly available sources.

-- The Foreign Broadcast Information Service has been modernized to enable much more rapid editing and dissemination from the streams of information picked up from broadcast and press media around the world.

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-- A number of nuclear intelligence collection systems have been developed and operationally deployed. These systems have and are continuing to provide significant intelligence input on nuclear proliferation questions as well as to the much sought after technical intelligence on the Soviet nuclear weapon program. For example:

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without reflecting on recent qualitative improvements in the system. NIEs/SNIEs of the present period are simply better written, better presented, more timely, and more relevant to policymaker needs. Recent Agency assessments provide better coverage, are analytically more thorough, have frequently superior estimative quality. We much doubt, for example, that practice today would overlook--for several years before and after--overseas developments of a significance to US interests similar to those in Libya in 1969, Ethiopia in 1974, Afghanistan and Nicaragua in 1978."

From a low point in 1980 of only 12 national estimates, in 1983 we published some 50 national estimates as well as 25 other Inteligence Community assessments. These included estimates on issues that had not been addressed for four or more years including Soviet missile defense developments, the Soviet approach to arms control and use of deception, and the value of Western technology to their military buildup.

This increase in productivity of Community papers also is reflected in the production of finished intelligence by the Directorate of Intelligence at CIA. In 1983 that organization published more than 650 research papers on a nearly inconceivable range of subjects from Soviet weapons systems to population problems to the implications of international debt; prepared some 250 typescript memoranda in response to specific senior policymaker requests, published more than 5,000 current intelligence items in the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Daily, prepared a range of situation reports on crises in the Middle East and Central America, and simultaneously provided to policymakers a range of specialized publications including the monthly terrorist review, a bi-weekly report on international financial problems, situation reports on Afghanistan, monthly reports on international energy and economic problems and so on. In sum, both at the national intelligence level and in CIA the production and quality of finished intelligence for policymakers is at the highest level in history.

Science and Technology

A less well known component of our intelligence arsenal is the Science and Technology Directorate which develops improved methods of acquiring and analyzing information. By way of example, I visited last week a half dozen project people who manage technical projects for this purpose. Among the things they are working on are:

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To make that investment pay, we need the increased computer and other processing for the increased amounts of data which will be flowing in and the human capability to sort it out, evaluate it, and make sense of it. The budgetary requirement for processing the new photography and signals collection is significant while the increased talent needed to analyze it is relatively small but takes time to develop. We have programs bringing in the additional analysts and developing the processing capability over the next few years adequate to exploit the increased collection that will be coming in as a result of the amounts of money committed to building systems over the years 1982-1986. We have developed advanced computer technology which has enabled the introduction of sophisticated signals processing techniques able to assimilate the vast increase in data collected and to identify the information of highest interest for reporting. The timeliness of this reporting is being enhanced by initiatives which improve the speed and reliability of communications

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We are upgrading and developing new systems to task and interrelate our photographic, communications, radar and electronic collection systems and to improve and expedite exploitation of the data which they bring in.

Analysis

Analysis is in many ways the beginning and end of the whole process. Properly done, it targets human and technical intelligence collection, evaluates and sorts out what is collected, and determines what it adds up to. A great deal was heard about the purging of the clandestine apparatus in the late 1970s. Less evident to the public and, even within the government, is that during that same period morale problems and dissatisfaction led to a massive departure of professionals from the analytical side of CIA. For example, 20 years ago CIA had some 350 people working on Soviet economic matters. In 1981 that number was down to below 50. Overall, nearly half of our analysts left between 1977 and 1981. CIA's data bases and analytic ability in the Third World had been substantially dismantled.

My plan was to put the national estimate--representing the views of the entire Intelligence Community--at the heart of intelligence support to policymakers to ensure in a balanced and comprehensive way that information and judgments developed by each element of the Community would be incorporated. I have felt it important to give you and other decisionmakers a range of views rather than a compromise consensus and to be able to assure you that all intelligence sources have been drawn upon and given an opportunity to reflect their knowledge and judgment.

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-- DEA is now regularly disseminating foreign intelligence to the entire Community. Customs has agreed to undertake a similar program and is currently implementing the results of a CIA-sponsored survey. But this is just the beginning. Once Customs is under way, the focus will shift to Coast Guard and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction Centers. Both these organizations have rich information holdings and should disseminate to the entire Community.

Crisis Collection

To develop the ability to collect intelligence in sudden crises at unexpected locations, we are identifying experienced, linguistically qualified, culturally suitable agents and officers capable of rapid insertion into critical and probably hostile collection environments.

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Technical Collection

Our technical collection platforms have, for the most part, worked well during these years but major improvements will be coming on starting late this year.

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Should be Classified SI/TK

Decisions to build hugely expensive and highly productive technical collection systems soon to be available were made in the late 1970s. These systems are now being built and will begin to produce a sharply increased volume of information starting this year and running through 1987. This will improve our coverage with a new ability [redacted] 25X1

Over these next two years the amounts of money required in the building stage of these projects is at its peak. This is the primary reason for the large jump in the FY 85 budget requirement. Large investments in these collection systems have already been committed.

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